An Unfinished Task: The Incomplete Reform of China's State-owned Banks

By EO Editorial Board
Published: 2010-06-15

Cover Editorial - EO print edition no. 473
Translated by Tang Xiangyang

Original article:
[Chinese]

Last week, the Agricultural Bank of China (ABC) formally began down the path to be listed on the Shanghai and Hong Kong stock exchanges, a move that marks the final step in the reform of Chinese state-owned banks.

After the ABC dual-IPO is completed, all of China's five large state-owned commercial banks will be listed.

But we can't really say that this marks the completion of something but that it signals a new beginning of sorts

Reform of Chinese banks began in 1998, in the wake of the Asian Financial Crisis.

At that time, many abroad thought that that "China's state-owned banks were technically bankrupt" and there was great pressure on the banks to reform.

Since then, the Chinese government has spent huge amounts in reforming the banks.

In 1998, the Ministry of Finance provided the four largest state-owned commercial banks with a total of 270 billion yuan raised through the issuing of special government bonds; in 2000, China's four financial asset management companies took over 1.4 trillion yuan in bad loans from the four biggest state-owned banks; and starting from 2004, the State Council injected 45 billion US dollars of foreign reserves into the Bank of China and the Construction Bank of China, meanwhile, Central Huijin provided 15 billion yuan to the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China and encouraged the bank to seek foreign strategic investors.

Besides, the central government also offered the banks preferential tax policies so as to lessen the burden of branch closures and the laying off of employees.

The Construction Bank of China was listed in Hong Kong in 2005, followed by Bank of China, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, and the Communications Bank of China. Following their listings, the risk management of the banks has improved dramatically. For example, in the past, even a loan department director or a president of a banking branch was able to approve a loan project; but now there are loan review commissions that oversee the issuing of such loans, furthermore, both the categorization of loans and credit risk provisions have also greatly improved. The credit risk provision has gradually increased from less than 70 percent five years ago to100 percent, 120 percent or even 150 percent now.

Both the adequacy and quality of Chinese banks' capital funds are reaching their best levels in history. With capital adequacy ratios of 10 percent, some banks even reach 11 or 12 percent.

Some small and medium-sized banks even maintain their capital adequacy ratios at over 13%.

Judging from this year's first quarter profit reports, most of the 14 listed banks saw profits grow by around 40%.

All this testifies to the great success that Chinese banks have achieved through reform. But that's not to say, with the public listing of ABC that  reform has come to an end.

As a modern joint-stock bank, all the state-owned banks still have too many management problems that need to be solved.

During the financial crisis, the banks were encouraged by the central government to issue huge amounts of new loans to help stimulate the economy and they're still dealing with the difficulties of trying to recover from such a huge release of capital.

The capital adequacy ratios of the banks have obviously decreased, which has in turn led to a frenzied search for financing. Investors remain concerned over whether the banks can lead themselves to recovery and to deal with what will likely be a rapid rise in bad loans.

In addition, when the government introduced policies aimed at curbing the property bubble, the first thing it did was tighten the mortgage market.

In a lot of places local governments are also choosing to use direct administrative measures to rein in soaring property prices, such as fixing a higher deposit requirement and interest rates for second and third home purchases.

The biggest goal of reforming the Chinese banks is to change the system under which banks were expected, according to the planned economy model, to support local projects and where little attention was paid to the quality of loans. The plan was to make our banks independent and responsible for their own business performance and risks.

When banks are expected to step in and ensure GDP growth and are also used by local governments to help rein in property prices, they are no longer enterprises.

Furthermore, still to this day, all the high-level executives of the state-owned banks are still government officials, not real bankers.

These factors are already starting to weigh down upon the price of banking stocks. Currently, the value of banking stocks remain low and despite an improving economic situation, the prices of banking stock continues to fall.

Statistics from the Oriental Securities show, it is predicted that the average price-to-equity ratio of all the 14 Chinese banks listed in the A-share market will only be 1.73, a low not experienced since 1996.

Therefore, after gaining a huge amount of money by listing on the stock market, it will be a great challenge for the Agricultural Bank of China to manage itself like a real commercial bank.

This challenge is not only targeted at banks, but also at other companies in which the state is a major shareholder and even government departments.

How to be rid of the influence of government? This is question for all the state-owned banks to deal with.

This article was edited by Pang Lei